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Uranium Mining on the Navajo Indian Reservation: An Environmental Examination
of the Process and Impact
Abstract
Uranium mining on the Navajo Reservation created an environmental justice disaster which has strangely
helped bring the Navajo Nation to achieve considerable self-determination within the United States.
The United States’ need for uranium to fuel the nuclear weapons and energy program brought the Atomic
Energy Commission to establish an extensive mining operation on Southwestern edge of the Colorado
Plateau. Many of mines established were on or near the Navajo Indian reservation. The Navajo Nation
received little share in the profits due to poorly constructed lease and royalty contracts. What is more,
most mines employed almost entirely Navajo men who were never told of the known health hazards from
radiation expose. The Navajo people were desperate to work, the AEC was driven to produce uranium as
quickly as possible, and the mining companies working for the AEC wanted the largest possible profits.
Despite pressure from the Public Health Service (PHS), who had been gathering data revealing dangerous
levels of radiation exposure, no regulations were imposed for nearly thirty years. By this time, health
problems predicted by PHS were coming true and uranium workers were dying of cancers and lung
diseases. The horror of this spreading sickness spurred the Navajo people to act and fight for justice.
After a long battle they finally achieved acknowledgment that the U.S. government had negligently failed
to protect the health of uranium miners. The testimonies of the miners, their widows and their families tell
heartbreaking tales of the anger, frustration and sadness the Navajo people have experienced because
they felt they were betrayed by the government, lost family members and were left to live in toxic
environments. However, fueled by this range of emotions the Navajo Nation has changed significantly.
The Tribal Council has asserted authority in the creation of new leases and regulations to ensure the
Navajo people benefit from the extraction of their natural resources. Individuals worked to unite
communities in the fight for justice and respect. Navajo government organizations such as the office of
Abandoned Mine Lands have even set new standards for reclamation and community redevelopment
projects. While circumstances at the start of uranium mining were perfect to enable the exploitation of
the Navajo people, new circumstances created by changes in National policy and Navajo initiates have
made the Navajo Nation a more wary and self-determined nation. Unfortunately, this long awaited goal
and respected sovereignty has come at a very high price.
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FORWARD
The Navajo uranium mining experience affected almost all aspects of Navajo life
and should be studied from many perspectives. However, the complex history and
political and social development that changed the Navajo Nation through the course of
the uranium mining years is a constant theme. The tragic consequences of uranium
mining forced the Navajo people to take responsibility for their lands and welfare by
strengthening their government and developing their own economy. This argument is
discussed in the environmental history thesis: Yellowcake on the Windowsill: Uranium
Mining on the Navajo Reservation.
This paper builds on the above argument and examines the actual mechanisms of
mining, milling and reclaiming the land. In doing so it illustrates not only the processes,
but the commitment and passion of the Navajo people to restore their lands. It argues that
the environmental nature of the uranium mining problems is the reason these events, and
not numerous political injustices before it, spurred the Navajo Nation to take action.
Further, this paper focuses on environmental damage and restoration particularly
related to land and water, for those who are interested in more information on the
simultaneous environmental health crisis that affected the miners and their battle for
Radiation Exposure Compensation; they should refer to Yellowcake on the Windowsill
which details the miners’ personal experiences.
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MAP

General spread of mines across the Grants Mineral Belt within the Navajo Reservation.
Note: Mt. Taylor is one of the four sacred peaks of the Traditional Navajo Homelands.

Map from: presentation by Mitchell Capitan, Crownpoint, New Mexico
Larry J. King, Church Rock, New Mexico ENDAUM Board Members September 9,
2004
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INTRODUCTION:

Author’s photograph January 2006, Navajo Reservation

It is not often one comes across a bright-yellow road sign that reads “Congested
Area” when there are no people or structures in sight. However, a road sign just like this
is hard to miss when traversing route 666 north or south through the heart of the Navajo
reservation. Here, even “Congested” is all relative.
It is signs like these that remind people passing through that they are in a different
country, the Navajo Nation. Spreading across the four corners region of the Southwest,
and covering large portions of New Mexico and Arizona, the Navajo Nation is the largest
reservation and indigenous nation in the United States. It has been a long journey for the
Navajo people as they have sought to define the sovereignty of their Nation.
Like many reservations across the U.S., the Navajo people are situated on land
incredibly rich in natural resources. The high desert and impressive mesas of the four
corners region were rightly judged as poor land for agriculture, but beneath this arid
surface is an abundance of oil, coal, natural gas, and even uranium. When the United
States negotiated the Treaty of 1868 with the Navajo people, they had no idea they were
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creating the Navajo reservation over such a wealth of resources. Later, in 1923, the U.S.
was interested in accessing the reservation’s natural resources, and created a Tribal
Council of Navajo representative to serve as the Navajo Government. The U.S. then used
the Tribal Council to administer leases for the extraction of natural resources. Driven to
expedite the leasing process, the U.S. manipulated the Tribal Council into granting Indian
Commissioner Hagerman of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) the right to determine
and administer leases across the reservation on behalf of the Navajo people.
In less than ten years, the Navajo peoples’ lives changed significantly. The tribal
governance system that existed before the instillation of the Tribal Council was
deteriorating. Yet, the new Tribal Council did not really have control over the Navajo
peoples’ most valuable natural resources, and white prospectors and miners came into the
reservation, mined and left. The Navajo people endured the degradation of their
homelands and received very little money from leases or royalties in return.
However, problems with inadequate royalty and lease payments were still a better
situation than on many reservations, where Native American land was first privatized to
individual Native Americans and then sold to the federal government or mining
companies. Ever since the 1868 treaty, the U.S. government had tried to change the
Navajo peoples’ relationship with the land. Primarily sheep and cattle herders, the Navajo
people roamed through their vast landscape on commonly held lands and seasonally
occupied different sections of the reservation. Hoping to make the Navajo people live
more like white settlers, the U.S. continually proposed land allotment programs. A family
or single man could claim one hundred and sixty acres of land if he then agreed to farm
it. The land he chose would no longer be part of the reservation nor eligible for the
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support of Federal aid, but would be private property – available for sale at the owner’s
discretion. However, tied to traditional communal land use and herding, the Navajo
people were not receptive to this program.
Again, in 1887, the U.S. government attempted to break down tribal structures by
allotting reservation lands across the U.S. This plan, the General Allotment or Dawes
Act, succeeded in many other tribes. But the arid conditions and generally unsustainable
farming lands of the Navajo reservation made it impossible for the BIA to force the
Navajo people onto allotted lands without also forcing them to starve and become
dependent on the Federal government for survival.
In the 1930’s conditions on the reservation became worse. Despite the
Federal government’s intent to preserve the precarious self-sufficiency of the Navajo
people, they instituted a reservation-wide stock reduction policy. Conservationists, as
well as the engineers of the new dams on the Colorado River, believed the large herds on
the Navajo reservation were contributing to soil erosion and thus an excess of silt and
debris in the Colorado River. These materials were then moving downstream, and dam
engineers feared they would cause problems for the new dams designed to provide water
for the growing population of white farmers in the southwest. John Collier, a man
anachronistically committed to preserving Native American culture, organized a stock
reduction plan. Although Collier did not intend to destroy the self-sufficiency of the
Navajo people, he did not understand their complete dependence on their herds. Collier’s
reduction policy most hurt families with small herds who could not survive once their
herds were further reduced. Without stock and unable to farm, the Navajo people soon
turned to federal government aid for survival.
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John Collier took the position as Commission of Indian Affairs during Franklin
Roosevelt’s administration in 1933. Employed as a journalist and social worker for years,
Collier was frustrated with the pressure for all people to assimilate in modern American
society, and he romantically sought the preservation of original cultures. Collier first
worked among immigrant communities in East Coast cities, but did not find his passion
until he came in contact with the Native American tribes of the Southwest. Immersing
himself in Indian affairs, Collier was opposed to the assimilation policies of the past
decades, and advocated instead for policies to preserve the traditions and promote the
sovereignty of Native American tribes.
He brought his philosophy into action with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
(IRA). Considered the “Indian New Deal”, this legislation required each tribe to accept
the program individually. Collier went to the Indian Congresses of tribes across the
country and persuaded them to accept the IRA. Tribes that accepted were then guided
through the construction of a tribal constitution modeled after the democratic structure of
the U.S. constitution. Further, Collier enlisted the assistance of other government
agencies to cooperate with the Office of Indian Affairs and help revive many Native
American communities. Among these were the Public Works Administration, the
Resettlement Administration, and the Civilian Conservation Corps.1 The IRA
significantly changed the direction of Federal Indian policy in the U.S. But,
unfortunately, the Navajo people no longer trusted Collier because they were suffering
from the effects of the stock reduction policy. A tribal constitution, even one as

1

Native Americans and the New Deal: The Office Files of John Collier, 1933-1945. LexisNexis Academic,
2205. Available at: http://lexisnexis.com/academic/2upa/Anas/NativeAmericansNewDeal.asp, 1.
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undemocratic as those organized for the tribes that did accept the IRA, would have to
wait for the Navajo people.
Beyond the economic disaster brought on by the Navajo stock reduction policies,
Navajo social structure was disrupted. Women who traditionally managed the herds were
no longer contributing to their family’s stability, and many men left the reservation and
their families to find work. The demand for labor during World War II provided an
abundance of off reservation jobs for Navajo men and women in factories. Further, many
Navajo men joined the U.S. military for the opportunity to work, as well as prove their
honor as Navajo warriors. Among the men who served were the famous Navajo code
talkers, who used the Navajo language to transmit military information for many of the
battles in the Pacific. During the war the Navajo people were working, but they were
displaced from the reservation and slowly rupturing the traditional tribal and family
structures.
After World War II, and the close of war industries, many of the Navajo people
who had left the reservation returned. Unfortunately, there was little to return to. Without
stock or agriculture or any sort of economic infrastructure, the Navajo people were soon
starving. Promises of guardianship made by the U.S. government date back to the treaty
of 1868, and included providing for the well being of the Navajo people, their education,
and assistance in the development of the Navajo reservation. Almost all these promises
had gone unfulfilled. Further, National Indian Policy had again changed its focus. John
Collier’s ideas of tribal sovereignty were lost, and a new movement to end the reservation
system and any federal support for Native Americans gained momentum. As with the
General Allotment Act, the Navajo people were essentially spared from the new

11

termination and off-reservation relocation programs because of the poverty and dire
conditions across the reservation. The Navajo people remember this period as “the
starving time.”
Looking back at this period of time in the late 1940’s, it is easy to see it as a
critical juncture in Navajo history. Prior to this time period, the Navajo people had
roamed south from Canada along the Rocky Mountains to the southern end of the
Colorado Plateau, and established this region as their homelands. For centuries they had
defended this area from other tribes, Spanish conquistadors traveling north from Mexico,
and eventually Americans. During the hundred years immediately prior they fought not
only for their land, but for their identity as a people. Finally, the American mission to
assimilate the Navajo people and access the natural resources of their lands left them at
the mercy of the American Federal government for survival. In the 1940’s this history of
dependency, guardianship, and uncertain sovereign identity were all challenged, and the
Navajo people and Nation were forever changed. This challenge was the arrival of
uranium mining on the Navajo reservation, the environmental health and justice disaster
it created, and the response of the Navajo people.
This is the story of how the Navajo people endured the uranium mining industry
and helped the United States achieve nuclear superiority, only to later discover that the
working conditions in the mines and mills were toxic to the health of the miners and their
families. Worse, these health hazards were known and yet no regulations were
established to protect the Navajo people. The sacred Navajo homelands were also
damaged and irreparably polluted as a result of the uranium mining industry. However,
this is also the story of how the Navajo people finally fought back against the injustice
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they suffered, and how they were forced to start developing their own governance system
and economy. They came to learn how to both exercise their rights as a sovereign nation
and their rights as citizens of the United States to gain control over their own destiny.
This included the regulation of leases, the establishment of schools, and acceptance of
federal funds to jump start their own programs, including the reclamation of mine lands
across the reservation.
The experience and history of uranium mining that forced the Navajo Nation to
exercise self-determination is a fascinating and dynamic study of its own. However, it is
equally important to understand why it took the uranium environmental and health crisis
to force the Navajo people to action. Part of the situation was timing. Native American
activism advanced dramatically in the 1970’s following the Civil Rights movement, and
gave Native Americans a new voice with which to protest against injustice and agitate for
change. But, beyond the historical timing of the uranium mining experience, issues
related to health and the environment disrupted the most important elements of Navajo
society. To fully understand the significance of the health and environmental nature of
the hardships the Navajo people endured, these problems themselves must be understood.
Only after examining the details of the mining experience, environmental damage, and
even the environmental restoration process, can one decide if and why environmental
activism in particular was a distinctly successful path to self-determination for the Navajo
people.
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PART ONE: Uranium and Mining

35 gram uranium ore in a sample of carnotite rock from Uravan, Colorado: Picture from E-bay
2
where this piece of carnotite is available for sale with bids starting at a dollar.

Uranium
Although radio-activity had fascinated scientists since the beginning of the
twentieth century, uranium had been overlooked in favor of the more highly radio-active
compound radon. For a short time it was believed that radon could cure cancer because it
killed fast growing cells. Further, radon is luminescent, and by World War I it was
included in the paint applied to watch dials and other gages on military equipment to
make them visible in the dark for soldiers. Only several years later did scientists realize
that prolonged low level exposure to radio-active material actually harmed normal cells
and increased the likelihood of tumors. The potential for controlled nuclear energy was
only understood years later and put to use by a group of elite scientists including Albert
Einstein.
When the United States decided to pursue the development of nuclear weapons,
they looked to uranium and made a previously useless mineral incredibly valuable. On
the Southern portions of the Colorado Plateau mining was already underway for
2

E-bay sales, sample sold by rockjimbo, specimen collected in October of 1999. Available information at:
http://cgi.ebay.com/URANIUM-ORE-CARNOTITE-IN-SANDSTONE-UravanColorado_W0QQitemZ6626540848QQcategoryZ3224QQssPageNameZWDVWQQrdZ1QQcmdZViewIte
m
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vanadium, a mineral contained in a yellow-green formation called carnotite
(K2(UO4)2(VO4)2*3H2O). While vanadium was extracted from carnotite deposits and
used to strengthen steel, the other minerals in carnotite, uranium and potassium, were
discarded. Uranium was sometimes used as a coloring agent in ceramic glazes producing
a bright orange-red shade best known as part of a line named Fiestaware, but was
otherwise considered of little value.3 The Manhattan Project, or properly the Manhattan
Engineering District (MED), was led by Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. Charged with acquiring the materials to develop a nuclear
bomb, he restricted all uranium purchase to the U.S. government, bringing an end to red
Fiestaware. In particular, the MED took control of the mills and tailings piles in Uravan,
Colorado. This mining town was isolated and existed solely to mine the carnotite ores in
the area. The MED sent around thirty service men into Uravan to operate one of the mills,
and process the discarded vanadium tailings to extract uranium. 4
While most citizens in the surrounding area were not aware that the government
was extracting uranium prior to the bombings in Japan, they were immediately after and
were proud of their contribution.5 However, only one-seventh of the uranium used by the
Manhattan project had actually come from the Colorado Plateau. The majority of U.S. ore
was purchased from the two largest uranium mines in the world, the Shinkolobwe Mine
in the Belgian Congo, and the Eldorado Mine at Port Radium on Bear Lake, Northwest
Territories, Canada. These mines were extracting pitchblende or uraninite rather than
carnotite. Pitchblende is primarily composed of uranium (UO2), and therefore a much

3

Michael A. Amundson, Yellowcake Towns, Uranium Mining communities in the American West (Boulder,
University Press of Colorado, 2002), 8.
4
Amundson, 10.
5
Ibid., 11.
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better source of high-grade uranium ore than the carnotite on the Colorado Plateau.
Nonetheless, due to the U.S.’s urgency to acquire uranium in the early 1940’s, around
eighty-six percent of the uranium used in the Manhattan Project was purchased from the
Belgian Congo and Canada. 6 In 1944 the MED had purchased just over 6,000 tons of
uranium, and felt adequately supplied to produce bombs through the fall of 1945.7
While this supplied the uranium needed for the Manhattan Project, it was not a
secure and sustainable source of uranium for continuing U.S. nuclear development. After
World War II ended, the United States moved to open the new atomic field to general
bureaucracy and remove all nuclear control from secret military operations.8 So, just shy
of one year after the War, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act. This created the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and established the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy (JCAE), which was composed of nine senators and nine representatives to
oversee the AEC’s operations. In 1947, the AEC officially took control, and with it
assumed the responsibility of supplying scientists and engineers a reliable supply of U.S.
uranium.9 There was no guarantee that the international purchase of uranium would
always be available, nor did the AEC want to create more suspicion about why exactly
they were purchasing such large quantities of a mineral not commonly used.
In 1948 the AEC began an extensive program to encourage prospecting and
mining for uranium. All ore was purchased by the government at a fixed price. Early
purchasing structures made uranium mining lucrative for large corporations, but were not
well suited to individual prospectors and entrepreneurs. After considerable tweaking, the

6

Ibid,., 8.
Ibid., 11.
8
Ibid., 20.
9
Ibid., 21.
7
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AEC finally established a plan that could make uranium mining profitable even for a
successful novice. This plan included bonuses for new discoveries and new mines, and
payment incentives for transporting the ore to AEC facilities.10 This program drew a rush
of uranium prospectors to the southern end of the Colorado Plateau and all throughout the
Navajo reservation.
In addition to the AEC’s work with the U.S. Geological Survey to scout out
potential uranium deposits on the ground and in the air, individual prospectors roamed
about with Geiger counters searching for the tell-tale greenish-yellow carnotite ore.
Carnotite existed in many forms. Early in geologic time uranium was likely contained in
hydrothermal veins at the top of volcanic intrusions. Over time these protruding veins
were eroded and washed across the landscape. As the uranium traveled it settled in the
sandy materials and helped secure these elements into the sandstone that makes ups the
mesas and anti-clines across the Colorado Plateau today. In particular, uranium was
attracted to organic materials and is still sometimes found as petrified logs. Although
originally igneous, uranium is primarily located in the sedimentary Jurassic Morrison
Formation. This formation cuts directly across the Navajo reservation, and has proven to
be one of the most uranium rich regions of the United States.11
In addition to visually sighting carnotite deposits, because uranium is radio-active
it is detectable at considerable distances using devices such as Geiger counters, and
similar but more sensitive instruments. Once an outcropping was determined, geologist
prospectors called in geologists to conduct test drilling. They typically used rotary drill
rigs to drill into the ore horizon. From these holes they could then more accurately

10
11

Ibid., 23-25.
Conversation with Dr. Ed Doheny, author’s notes, 12 April, 2006.
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measure the radiation and determine the ore grade and other geological information. Still,
over ninety percent of sites that made it to test drilling were ultimately determined to
have insufficient ore to mine.12
The most lucrative deposit regions in the Morrison Formation were actually
discovered by Navajo men who were incredibly familiar with the landscape. In 1943,
when the Navajo people first heard rumors that white men were looking for the yellowgreen carnotite ores, Luke Yazzie, a young Navajo man who lived near Cove, Arizona,
showed the nearest white man who operated a reservation trading post a sample of
carnotite.. (Please see the map of the reservation to identify Cove just south of the four
corners and near the border of New Mexico) The trading post owner, Harry Goulding,
then showed this ore to geologists and prospectors who confirmed the rock as a very
uranium rich carnotite sample. Yazzie ended up leading a group of prospectors to the
outcropping where he had collected the ore sample, and opened up one of the most
productive regions of uranium production over the next thirty years. Although Yazzie
discovered the ore, and worked in several of the mines that later operated in the region,
he never received any royalties.13 The Carrizo Mountains, the area where Yazzie led
prospectors, were slowly mined until 1948 when the AEC’s uranium program was
introduced, at which point the area exploded with prospectors and became littered with
new mines and mining communities in the previously empty landscape.
Similarly, in 1951, on the southern end of the reservation near the small town of
Grants, New Mexico, a Navajo man named Paddy Martinez also brought white

12

Information packet titled “Highlights of the Discovery and Production of Uranium in the Grants District”
provided upon request by the Grants Uranium Museum, in Grants, NM., 2.
13
Peter Eichstaedt, If You Poison Us, Uranium Mining and Native Americans (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Red
Crane Books, 1994), 27, 178-181.
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prospectors a sample of ore from the area around his home on the eastern checkerboard
section of the reservation. The ore Martinez brought in also proved of excellent quality,
and he led prospectors to a range of sites. His discovery came in the midst of the
uranium rush, and the Grants area quickly was inundated with new prospectors.14 This
area became known as the Grants mineral belt, and produced a greater quantity and
quality or uranium ore than anywhere else in the Southwest. Uranium ore was mined at
the surface in mines such as the Anaconda Corporation’s Jackpile Mine, and deep
underground at depths of 3,000 feet near Ambrosia Lake.

Mining Practices

Author’s picture from the Grants Uranium Mining Museum

While the need for uranium and many locations of uranium deposits were
developed by the early 1950’s, mining and milling practices were done primitively,
especially in the more remote areas of the reservation. Both open-pit and underground
mining methods were used. If the overburden, the surface materials between the ground
and the ore deposit, was not too thick, open-pit mining was conducted. Although there
14

“Highlights of the Discovery and Production of Uranium in the Grants District” 2.
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was a large initial cost to remove the overburden and access the ore, once extraction was
underway the mining process was faster, safer, and less likely delayed as the result of
unexpected intrusions of other minerals or problems in mine stability. Open-pit mines
existed primarily in the Grants region and not farther north in the Carrizo Mountains.
They demanded an incredible amount of labor, and drew enough workers, families, and
services to build-up and change the Grants, Gallup, and Laguna populations. Just the
recorded direct payroll to these communities for the thirty-eight years that mining
occurred is estimated to exceed $1 billion.15
Underground mining was both more complicated and dangerous; however, it was
the most common form of uranium mining. The often unstable host rock, difficult
saturated environment below the water table, and a prevalence of aquifers throughout the
Colorado Plateau, made uranium mining especially difficult. Eventually, a standard
methodology for uranium mining was developed. First large access shafts approximately
8’ x 18’ were sunk into the ore horizon. Sometimes large oil drilling bits up to 16’ in
diameter were used. (Please see picture of drill bit outside of the Grants Uranium
Museum). The main shafts in the Grants region typically extended anywhere from 200’ to
3200’ depending on the location of the ore, as well as the surface topography.16 These
shafts were the main highway for all mine activity to the surface - for men, supplies, and
the ore. Near the shaft a building housed the machinery to operate an electric hoist. For
mines built into the side of mountains with horizontal or sloped entrance shafts, it was not

15
16

Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 3.
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uncommon during the first decade of mining that the laborers hauled out the ore
themselves.17
From the main shaft haulage drifts, tunnels approximately 8’x 8’ used to access
the ore and transport it to the shaft, were cut. These tunnels were cut horizontally below
the ore bodies to make use of gravity to remove the ore and drain water. Properly
constructed, water would drain from the area where ore was extracted, travel down the
haulage tunnels and into the bottom of the shaft were it was collected and pumped out.
Some mines pumped water at one hundred gallons per minute while others reached 5,000
gallons per minute. The removed water was held in storage tanks and often used in the
milling process.
All ore removal occurred by repeatedly drilling and blasting in promising
locations. Generally large ‘rooms’ or stopes of ore were blasted out, leaving only narrow
pillars for support while equipment called a slusher removed the ore. Removed ore was
then dropped into carts in the haulage tunnels below. The slusher was:
a heavy duty electric hoist, with two or three independently acting cable drums. Steel
cable extended from one drum through a sheave attached to the drift heading, and then to
the rear of a scraper type bucket. A second cable extended from the second drum to the
front of the bucket and in operations, pulled the bucket-broken ore to a raise [sic] position
[sic] For extracting pillars, three drums were used, two to position the bucket at any
location in the open stope area, and the third to pull the rock to the raise discharge
point.18
Removed ore was kept in piles near the mine before it was transported to a mill. Waste
materials were removed in the same manner, but always kept separate from the ore.19

17

Ibid.
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
18
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Mining Safety: A Jumbled Mess of Mixed Messages

Author’s picture taken at the Uranium Mining Museum in Grants, New Mexico

The physical challenges of working underground and removing large quantities of
ore from often unstable conditions presented many hazards to the miners. More unique
to mining uranium and a more persistent danger to the health of all miners, was poor
ventilation and radiation exposure. Basic ventilation to provide even limited breathable
air came from holes 36” to 76” in diameter connecting the working areas to the surface.
Large exhaust fans were placed on the top of these holes to pull air through the shafts.20
But given the radioactive nature of uranium, this meager ventilation was not adequate to
provide fresh air for the miners.
The majority, if not all, of the miners on the Navajo reservation were Navajo men
who had no knowledge or concept of radio-activity, radiation, or their related health risks.
Most miners were relieved to have work on the reservation and end the cycle of leaving
their families for short term employment. They were aware of the immediate dangers
involved in mining, and many were severely hurt or killed in mining accidents. In 1960
20

Ibid., 4.
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fatal mine accidents were steadily increasing, and prompted the creation of the Uranium
Operators Safety Council. Member companies were voluntary participants. When the
council was established in 1960, there were three fatal accidents per million man hours
worked in the mines; that year in the Ambrosia Lake area, a single site in the Grants
Mineral District, five and a half million man hours were worked.21 The council
established a list of new safety measures to increase safety in the mines. These measures
were successful the next year, and there were one-third the number of fatal accidents for
the same working hours.22 However, none of the new changes suggested to members of
the council made any mention of ventilation, air quality or radiation exposure. All
changes were focused on mine stability and the importance of trained employees.23 Only
in the last paragraph of the report is air quality mentioned, where it says,
In all the underground uranium mines, the control of radon and its daughter
products is of the utmost importance. Although the State Department of Mines
and Department of Health conduct periodic surveys, it is felt that additional
training should be given to company engineers who are responsible for the
frequent surveys needed for radiation control.24
No air quality standards were proposed, and the council only suggested that more
educational classes on the subject be arranged. This is a notable omission. The Public
Health Service officials had spent the last ten years surveying mine ventilation and air
quality, and determining safe standards for the regulations to reduce radiation exposure.25
The experience of one miner, Wilson P. Benally, attests to the danger of mining
as well as how little he was warned about health problems related to radiation exposures.
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He said that he “was severely hurt when a mine collapsed on him. He was told they were
mining uranium “for cars, gas and welding”, and when the mine collapsed on him “he
almost lost his sight. And on one side, his arm was paralyzed.” Yet, in regards to the risks
associated with uranium itself he was only told, “the uranium was a bit hazardous to his
health, but he was never told how it might affect his health later.”26 This was far from the
truth. Underlying the casual overlooking of radiation exposure by mine management,
safety councils, and the AEC, there was a substantial base of knowledge proving
radiation was dangerous to the miners’ health. Working in the mines continuously
exposed the miners to the same radio-activity that was used to locate the uranium
originally. Uranium breaks down into a long sequence of other radio-active materials,
among them radium. Close contact with concentrated uranium and radium exposes one to
incredibly dangerous gamma radiation, which can only be stopped by a foot of concrete
or an inch of lead. Most miners were effected less from exposure to radium’s gamma
radiation than they were from the effects of the radon gas produced from the breakdown
of radium. The half-life of radium to radon gas is 1,600 years, yet in closed mine spaces
accessed for the first time the air was often full of radon gas.
The radon gas continues to break-down into alpha and beta radio-active particles.
These particles are not as powerful as gamma radiation, but beta radiation can still burn
skin and are especially hazardous if ingested. Alpha particles are the weakest form of
radiation, and can be stopped by human skin or even a piece of paper. But, while these
particles can not be absorbed through the skin, they can be inhaled and ingested. Once
lodged inside the body they continue to emit particles and bombard the surrounding
tissues. Alpha particles are released during the breakdown of Radon to Polonium-218 and
26
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Polonium to Lead-214. Beta particles are released during the next series of breakdowns,
which occur rapidly because the longest half life of the next four stages is only 26.8
minutes for Lead-214 to Bismuth -214.
Mismanagement and the hard labor required to mine uranium increased the
miners’ exposure and ingestion of radio-active particles. Radon daughters can attach to
dust particles within the air and were easily inhaled with the heavy breaths of hardworking miners.27 Further, the Navajo men were often forced back into the mines very
soon after explosions, and well before most of the dust had settled. Don Yellowhorse
remembers that:
mechanical ventilation was rare in the mines, and with the constant drilling and
blasting it was often hard to breathe. ‘In some mines there [were] close to forty
people. There was a lot of smoke’ ‘They had plastic flexible pipes to blow the
smoke’ he said, but the systems were inadequate. ‘They [the miners] had a hard
time working because of the smoke. You could only see about three feet’28 We
had a hard time getting into the fresh air.
Under such conditions it was difficult not to inhale dangerous particles, and once inside
the body these particles became lodged in lung tissues. The particles they emitted then
created a constant bombardment on the nearby cells. Eventually, and this could take over
a decade, the continual cell damage resulted in a variety of lung cancers.
Because of the poor ventilation and extreme working conditions, miners also
inhaled fine silica particles contained in the mine dust. Silica is a sharp mineral that also
caused severe damage to the miners’ lungs. Often miners became sick with Silicosis, a
disease where damaged alveoli produce excessive amounts of mucus and greatly
impaired breathing, before they had lung cancer.
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Although inhalation associated risks were the primary hazard to the miners’
health, the miners also ingested uranium ore particles because they ate their lunch and
drank the water that ran down the mine walls. Aside from its radio-active properties,
uranium is a toxic substance. Over time uranium builds in the kidneys and bone marrow
of the body and causes severe problems. Uranium is also teratogenic, meaning it causes
birth defects. While most miners were men, they typically had no showers or changes of
clothes from the mines before they returned home to their wives and children. Women
were exposed to the dust their husbands and fathers brought home. In the later uranium
mining years, birth defects occurred among miners’ children at abnormally high rates.
Mary Louise Johnson has vivid memories of her husband returning from the mines
covered in dust and said that “when he came home he was all muddy, even his face. At
that time there was no running water, so we went to sleep just like that with him not even
washing…There was no laundromat so we washed their clothes by hand, not even
knowing the danger of the mine dust. And they did not warn us. We thought it was just
dirt.”29
The AEC, Public Health Service, and mining companies were aware of the longterm effects of radiation exposure as well as the dangerously high levels of exposure in
the Navajo reservation mines as early as 1950. Documentation of their failure to inform
the miners of known health risks, as well as their refusal to impose regulations to protect
the miners during the first twenty years of mining, was collected as part of the Navajo
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peoples’ fight to receive compensation from the U.S. government for the severe health
problems they later suffered.

Uranium Milling:

Uranium Café: serving “Yellowcake burgers”
Author’s photo Grant’s New Mexico

Though uranium mining has received the most attention in recent years, the
milling process was equally damaging for its employees and the environment. The
Radiation Exposure and Compensation Act (RECA) does not apply to sickness, death or
disability from work in uranium mills, and its restriction has prevented due attention to
the hazards of the milling process.
Refined uranium ore - or yellowcake - was the finished milled product, and this
product as well as the waste tailings produced were familiar sights in mining
communities. Taylor Dixon, a former mill worker from Two Grey Hills, New Mexico,
described how he saw the uranium industry and the intrusion of yellowcake and mill
tailings collide with Navajo culture from observing his children. He said,
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You see it is not good for my children, who come back from school to play in the
piles. Whatever they brought home from the piles they used as toys. Corn Pollen
and uranium are the same color and they ate some uranium. This is true; they put
them on their window sills. Corn pollen is used by the Navajos in house blessing
and other ceremonies. In the Blessingway ceremony, pollen is usually applied to
the head, to the tongue and scattered before one in prayer [eds.].30

In many ways milling was more harmful to the Navajo people as a whole because the
tailings produced and left in the community exposed everyone including women and
children. Further, tailings also damaged the environment -- even contaminating the
ground water that the Navajo people relied on for drinking and watering their livestock.
Yet, milling was a crucial process in the uranium industry on the Navajo
reservation because uranium ore was in carnotite deposits. In the Grants Mineral District,
there were generally only four pounds of uranium-308 per ton of ore processed. Other
areas had slightly higher yields; however, because of the nature of the sandstone carnotite
deposits, the ore was never as rich as the ore mined from pitchblende deposits such as
those in Canada and the Belgian Congo.31
Processing the ore first required that the ore was crushed to sand-sized particles, to
expose the uranium coating the sand particles in the sandstone. Then, to dissolve the
uranium, the sand was soaked with hydrochloric acid or sodium carbonate-bicarbonate,
depending on the mill and specifics of the ore. The sand was washed to ensure all the
uranium had been removed before the sand was separated and placed in tailings piles.
Then the “uranium in solution was subjected to numerous chemical and physical changes
to obtain an overall extraction percentage as high as economically possible.”32 Finally,
the uranium was extracted from solution, filtered, dried and placed in 55 gallon drums,
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weighing about 800 pounds. The final product was called yellowcake and was
approximately eighty-three-percent uranium-308.33
Most milling procedures followed the same pattern of processing, but were each
tuned to best extract uranium from the ores of their providing mines. This often required
the use of different chemicals to more effectively and efficiently extract uranium. The
New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources published Geology and
Technology of the Grants Uranium Region, a book prepared for the Society of Economic
Geologists for their Uranium Field Conference in 1963. Among the articles is the
“Rudiments of Uranium Ore Metallurgy” by Dale C. Matthews. He traces the variables in
ore grinding, ore leaching, solids-fluid separation, solution extraction, precipitation, and
special heat treating. His analysis is highly specific, but reveals how important it was to
properly address all the additional components in uranium ore to best extract uranium.
Chemical costs to process uranium ore could therefore vary from one to seven dollars per
ton of ore. By 1960 the milling process was well established, and 27 mills were
operating across the country. In 1961 alone 17,400 tons of U-308 were produced and
valued at $300,000,000.34
This great quantity of ore meant an even greater quantity of waste was produced.
The tailings and used chemicals were stored near the mills in large piles and settling
pools. The heavy metals, radio-active particles, and acids from this waste slowly leached
into the surrounding environment. Further, although the uranium was removed, most of
the piles were still highly radio-active. Even today there are unhealthy levels of radiation
in the general vicinity around tailings piles. During the mining years most residents of
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mine communities were unaware of the dangers from the tailings piles. Lorraine Jack of
Cudei, New Mexico, even remembers being on and around the uranium mill tailings piles
while she was pregnant and said, “As a pregnant mother I used to go there. So the babies
were born; from there to now they grew and they played there, just as I did. Ore that was
dangerous was piled up and they played on it…didn’t know it was dangerous. So we
exposed them all [Children], just as we were exposed before…”35 The most drastic
environmental problems from the uranium mining industry were in fact not from the
mines themselves, but from the tailings and settling pools left behind from the milling
process.
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PART TWO: The Church Rock Uranium Mill Tailings Spill

Author’s photo Eastern Navajo reservation

Uranium mining continued on the Navajo reservation following similar
procedures for the first twenty years of its operations. Then, in the 1960’s, the AEC felt
it had an adequate supply of uranium for U.S. defense and development purposes. Slowly
the AEC started to open uranium purchasing to commercial interests. The timing could
not have been better - new technology was just expanding into large-scale energy
production. Nuclear plants would soon spring up in the United States, and each
demanded uranium. Further, in 1969 Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz had finally
secured regulations and standards to limit uranium miners’ radiation exposure. His
standards required that radiation levels within the mines not only be monitored, but
maintained at low levels. While these regulations came seventeen years after the start of
the uranium industry, and seventeen years too late for many miners who were already
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dying from diseases related to radiation exposure, the regulations did protect future
miners.36
The uranium industry was slowly becoming less deadly for its employees, but
unfortunately no less dangerous for the environment. The decades of mining had
produced tremendous amounts of unaddressed wastes scattered across the Navajo
reservation. Each site had it own set of problems. Yet, as these sites remained, even more
abandoned mines, tailing piles and settling ponds were produced. United Nuclear
Corporation, one of the largest uranium mining companies in the southwest, began new
mining operations in the Church Rock, New Mexico area in 1969. To meet the demand of
their mines, and that of the Kerr-McGee mines in Northeast Church Rock, United
Nuclear opened their Church Rock mill. These mines and mills contributed to the
tremendous production of the Grants Uranium Region, where forty-five percent of the
U.S.’s uranium was produced from 1966-1979. 37
The tailing and settling pools of this mill were constantly a cause for concern for
the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Division (NMEID), who per the
Agreement States program was “responsible for licensing nuclear industrial facilities and
regulating the handling of specific types of radioactive materials” in place of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commissions (NRC), but still in accordance with their guidelines. NMEID
was also responsible for the water quality in the state of New Mexico, including all
discharges into the groundwater and related aquifers. The United Nuclear Corporations’
(UNC) seepage of tailings fluid was the worst of all five licensed and active uranium
36
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tailings facilities in New Mexico.38 “An estimated 15,000 to 80,000 gallons of raw
tailings ‘raffinate’, high in radioactivity and toxic metals and process chemicals, seep
daily from the UNC evaporation ponds into underlying aquifers…contamination is
evident in site monitoring wells at depths up to 240 feet below the surface, according to
the company’s own information.”39 These problems were first addressed as early as 1976.
John Dudley, a NMEID hydrologist, was concerned because the tailing impoundment
was unlined and there were “permeable areas in the tailings impoundment exposed during
construction.”40 Despite this information, no plans for a seepage discharge system were
ordered by NMEID until October of 1979 – after disaster had already occurred.
On July 16, 1979 part of the UNC tailings dam in Church Rock, New Mexico
broke. Estimates of almost 100 million gallons of radioactive and contaminated water and
debris flooded into the Rio Puerco River. Typically running low-dry at that time of year,
the banks of the Rio Puerco were overflowing as the hazardous waste traveled
downstream. Two hundred and fifty acres and thirty to seventy miles of the Rio Puerco
were severely damaged for an undeterminable amount of time.41 What happened - or did
not happen - to bring about this problem? Were there not better alternatives before and
after the spill?
Prior to the spill, three hundred and fifty Navajo families lived in the area
surrounding Church Rock and the Rio Puerco, working in the uranium industry and often
also herding cattle, goats, and sheep across the arid land. For both the people and the
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animals, the Rio Puerco was a life source. This all changed when “eleven hundred tons of
radioactive mill wastes and ninety million gallons of contaminated liquid [went] pouring
towards Arizona. The wall of water backed up sewers and lifted manhole covers in
Gallup, twenty miles downstream, and caught people all along the river unawares”.
Herbert Morgan of Mauelito, New Mexico remembers that he “‘was wondering where it
came from. Not for a few days were we told.’”42
The tailings and liquor, the acid milling liquids, were held in ponds by UNC to
allow evaporation of the liquids and then removal of the solid wastes. The pond was only
planned to stay in place for eighteen months, but had already been operating for twentyfive months at the time of the accident. The dam holding the material was earthen and
lined with clay stretching twenty-five feet high and thirty-feet wide. The accident
occurred when a twenty-five foot wide section gave way. The contaminated materials
poured out of this opening to the Rio Puerco along a wash created from the wastewater
produced from mine dewatering. This contaminated water had paved a way to the river.
There was little immediate action or outcry to the spill. Within a few days, signs
in English, Navajo, and Spanish were placed along the Rio Puerco warning people to stay
away from the river and keep their animals away as well.43 Slowly, as the extent of the
spill was revealed and the situation investigated, community outrage grew. While his
brother Stewart Udall was fighting for compensation for the Navajo uranium miners,
Representative Morris K. Udall brought congressional attention to the Church Rock spill.

42

Quoting Kathie Saltzstein, “Navajos Ask $12.5 Million in UNC Suits,” Gallup Independent, August 14,
1980 in Harvey Wasserman and Norman Solomon, “Chapter Nine: Uranium Mining and the Church Rock
Disaster” in Killing our Own, the Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation (New York:
Dell Publishing, 1982) 1. (Complete text available online at
http://www.ratical.org/radiation/KillingOurOwn/K009.html
43
“Tailings Dam Break”, 1.

34

He believed it could have been avoided had appropriate decisions and planning been
carried out. In a Congressional hearing he said, “‘at least three and possibly more Federal
and state regulatory agencies had ample opportunity to conclude that such an accident
was likely to occur.’ Even before the dam had been licensed ‘the company’s own
consultant predicted that the soil under this dam was susceptible to extreme settling
which was likely to cause [its] cracking and subsequent failure.”44 In addition to the
seepage problems already discussed before the dam break, cracks were visible in the dam
in its first year. Evidence continued to mount against UNC.
Its chief operating officer J. David Hann admitted that they took a chance the dam would
be unsettled because it was contrasted partly on bedrock and partly on softer ground.
Hann said this divide “‘served as a fulcrum, resulting in transverse cracking.’ The breach
was ‘like many things you undertake…they have a risk, and we undertook this.’”45
But Hann and UNC were no longer operating in the glow of the nuclear age. For
several years, beginning as early as the discontinuation of the AEC and the establishment
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the public was growing wary of the
nuclear industry. Occurring only fourteen weeks after the Three-Mile Island incident in
Pennsylvania, and the severe skepticism it produced, the NRC could not justify taking
hasty and risky actions due to the importance of development, or for national security.
The NRC’s Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, as well as the New
Mexico State Engineer’s Office, made clear the spill occurred as the result of UNC
negligence. The spokesman for the New Mexico State Engineers office said at the same
44
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Congressional hearing led by Morris Udall that, “a ‘consensus’ of engineers who
reviewed the accident agreed that ‘had the drain zone been constructed according to the
approved plans and specifications, and had the tailings breach been in place as
recommended by [UNC’s] engineers, it is likely that failure would not have occurred.’”46
The clean-up and subsequent management of the tailings piles and materials were
just as disorganized and unreliable as the original construction and maintenance of the
dam. UNC was charged with the clean-up, but unfortunately did only a bare minimum to
reclaim the lands damaged by the mines. Because there were few readings before the spill
to accurately measure natural conditions farther downstream, there were no baseline
levels of radioactivity for reclamation to achieve.47 Appallingly, UNC sent small crews of
no more than thirty-five men along the banks of the Rio Puerco to remove affected
sediment from the streambed and place it in fifty-five gallon drums. Such action was
almost farcical because pollutants had already been transferred far downstream and
penetrated thirty feet below the surface. Worst, it was feared that the precious aquifers
may have also been contaminated. Beyond the river, the flooding from the spill had
created small pools of pollutants separate from the river, and easily accessible to
unknowing children and animals.
The primary components of the pollution were radioactive particles and acids.
After uranium was removed, eighty-five percent of the ore’s original radioactivity was
left behind in the tailings along with ninety-nine percent of the original volume. In
addition to dissolving the uranium, the acids used in milling dissolved thorium 230,
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radium 222, lead 210 and other isotopes.48 These particles are more soluble after the
milling process, and thus more dangerous when released into the environment or in
humans and animals that ingest it. An alpha emitter, thorium is also toxic, perhaps as
toxic as plutonium, and if ingested is deposited like uranium in the liver, bone marrow
and lymphatic tissues. Again, like uranium, such deposits create fatal cancers and
disease.49
While people read the signs and cleared away from the river, it was very difficult
to prevent livestock from ingesting pollutants. A study of eleven animals by the CDC
confirmed that the kidneys and livers of local livestock contained elevated levels of
pollutants and should not be eaten.50 But, for many of the Navajo people living in the
area, these livestock were their primary means of survival. As one Navajo shepherd said,
there are signs saying, “contaminated wash, keep out. But, our cows, sheep and horses
can’t read that.”51
The contaminated water has forced changes in the way of life for many of the
Navajo people living around the Rio Puerco, and they suffer isolation from their
neighbors who fear trade and contact will risk spreading the contamination.52 The
closing of several of the area’s mines forced the men out of work and placed more need
for survival off of potentially contaminated livestock. Many families were forced to
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travel daily to the Manuelito Chapter House (the smallest unit of Navajo government) to
collect fresh water because they could no longer use the water from the Rio Puerco. The
changes have altered Navajo cultural life as well. Anthropologist Donna Deyhle wrote an
article in Century magazine in May of 1982 describing some of the cultural changes.
“’Navajos from the communities [affected by the Rio Puerco spill] are reluctant to donate
sheep that might not be healthy to relatives for ceremonies. Ceremonies are less
frequently held in these communities.’”53 Many of the Navajo people affected by the spill
learned about radiation for the first time when they sought explanations for the problems
with the river, and the sickness and unhealing sores they were witnessing on their
livestock. Years after the spill they are still living in fear of the long term consequences
to the health of their families and land.54
While the Navajo people waited and worried about their health, UNC continued
operations relatively undisturbed by the events of the spill. Some mine sites had closed,
but uranium operations in the region did not cease. Shockingly, the repaired tailings pool
was still in operation in 1981. Continuing corporate negotiations with government
regulatory agencies had prevented the close of the tailings site. Constant letters from
NMEID director Thomas Baca, such as that of May 26, 1981 to UNC, repeated “the
existing site is not suitable for long-term or permanent disposal of tailings”. Even this
failed to close the site. Finally, in 1982 UNC announced it would temporarily close the
tailings site because of the poor uranium market. Using this juncture as his opportunity to
permanently close the site, new NMEID director Russell Rhoades “withdrew permission
for UNC to continue to discharge tailings without an approved discharge plan” and the
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review of a public hearing.55 While active discharge to the site stopped, problems to
control seepage were never fully addressed.
Today the site is still dangerously contaminated, and there is no solution to cleanup either the complete tailings site or the Rio Puerco wash. NMEID is in fact not
optimistic that the groundwater will ever be completely restored because so much
damage had been done.56 Interviewed by Chris Shuey in April of 1981, Thomas Bailey,
President of United Nuclear Corporation, was surprisingly cavalier about the effects of
the spill and proud of UNC’s efforts to restore the site and aid the community. Bailey did
not want to talk about the cause of the spill but said,
I firmly believe that nobody was harmed by it. The only danger anybody would
have had was if they were in the bottom of the wash when the damn thing broke – and
then they’d probably have drowned. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission said the danger
to the livestock was for about 24 hours, and if they’d drank any of the water, it was so
acidic it’d have burned their tongues. In the first place, the animals are smarter than that,
and they’ll stick their tongue in once and that will be the end of it.57
When Shuey asked Bailey, “So do you think the regulatory and public outcry has
been too stringent toward UNC?” Bailey was eager to describe the efforts of UNC to
assist the Navajo community. He said, “It was an overreaction. You know, we had the
Three-Mile Island incident, then this thing happened, people were worrying about old
buildings made out of uranium mill tailings, and so everybody overreacted, including us
probably.”58 He added the expense of $100,000 a month to remove the top layer of
sediment from the Rio Puerco was a waste of money that didn’t help anyone because
there were no baseline measurements to determine if addressed areas were in fact clean.
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The best thing Bailey thought UNC did in response was provide fresh drinking water to
residents of the Rio Puerco area. He said, “We went to them and said, ‘Hey, who needs
water and who was affected by this thing?’ We were hauling clear to the Arizona
border.”59 Despite this self-praise, UNC was contractually obligated to provide fresh
drinking water if there was a spill. Moreover, they only provided water for less than a
year after the spill even though the water in the Rio Puerco was still unsuitable for
drinking over a year after the spill.
The Church Rock tailings spill is still an open sore for the Navajo people today.
Although it was the largest spill of radioactive materials in the United States, most people
are completely unaware of the incident. Today, residents in Chapters surrounding the
river and the Gallup area are still very wary of the water. Brother Simon, of the St.
Bonaventure Indian Mission in Thoreau, New Mexico, helps to run a water service
operation to the people of the Boca Chapter who do not have running water or resources
for water near their homes. Slightly farther east on the checkerboard reservation than
Church Rock, he makes a point to tell visitors to the reservation just how badly the spill
has affected and scared people on the reservation, and yet how little anyone else knows
about it.60
Although just one incident among many in the uranium mining industry on the
Navajo Reservation, the Church Rock Spill is compelling evidence of the lack of
responsibility and mismanagement among corporations, as well as government agencies,
that brought harm to reservation lands and the Navajo people. Also, like most of the
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problems related to uranium mining on the reservation, this too is often overlooked and
still ongoing.
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PART THREE: Land Reclamation and Uranium Mining Today
The Navajo Office of Abandoned Mine Lands

Author’s photo Navajo AML Office, in Widow Rock, New Mexico

Simultaneous to the uranium miners organizing to pursue compensation for their
radiation induced health problems, a combination of Federal policies and Navajo
government development started intensive efforts to reclaim the Navajo lands damaged
from uranium mining. Both these movements started in the mid-1970’s and just prior to
the Church Rock Tailings spill. After nearly thirty years of mining uranium across the
reservation the damages were unavoidable. Not only were people falling sick, but the
earth was also in distress. Situations similar to the Church Rock spill affecting both the
land and communities were seemingly everywhere. No longer trusting either the Federal
government or uranium companies to act with responsibility or respect for the Navajo
people, the Navajo Nation was forced to develop its own government infrastructure and
economy to provide for and protect its own well being. Perhaps the most successful
department to emerge in the slow climb to Navajo self-development was the Navajo
Office of Abandoned Mine lands (NAML).
In 1977 the U.S. Office of Surface Mines enacted the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act. The act was created to address dangerous coal mine sites in which
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accidents were occurring, primarily in Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Part of the act
detailed regulations on mining practices, and the other half created and provided for the
administration of a fund to reclaim abandoned mine lands. The fund was built by a thirtyfive cent fee collected on every ton of coal mined. The funds were kept separately for
each state. Originally, the funds were only applicable to mines abandoned prior to 1977,
but the policy was changed in 1990 to apply to all abandoned mine lands.61
In addition to uranium deposits, the Navajo reservation is rich with coal, oil and
natural gas. The SMCRA legislation collected fees on the coal mining that took place on
the reservation because it is considered federal land. Established under the era of
cooperative federalism, SMCRA legislation usually handed the funds over to state
agencies once they provided a system to administer and regulate the funds. On most
Indian reservation there is no corresponding agency to direct reclamation projects and the
work is carried out by the federal government. The Navajo Nation AML is unique, and
one of the few extremely successful Native American government agencies to earn
independent control of U.S government funds. The NAML quickly addressed all of the
abandoned coal mines across the reservation, and were then eligible to use their funding
for non-coal reclamation projects, including uranium mine sites.62
NAML directors scoured the reservation and identified all open mine sites and
tailing piles, identifying over a thousand different projects. The NAML prioritized these
projects based on their proximity and affect on Navajo communities. Next, plans for
removing the hazards of the sites were constructed. Unfortunately, SMCRA legislation
limits its funding to physical hazards and not to address long term assessments of the best
61
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clean-up to prevent continued environmental damage. Typically, mine reclamation
consists of sealing entrances to open mine shafts with foam, boarding the entrances, and
then covering the area with concrete. This process is meant to stop excessive escaping
radiation in the vicinity of the mine opening, and prevent any person or animal from
entering the mine.63
Open pit mines are more difficult to reclaim and often require moving large
amounts of earth. If the removed ore is still in the vicinity of the mine it is often used as
fill. Most open-pit mines collect water, and with disuse are generally full of murky,
polluted water that is dangerously used by livestock and animals as a watering spot.
Draining the mine is thus the first step in the reclamation process. Then, the mine is lined
with clay, or if necessary some site specific and relatively non-porous substance. The
most contaminated debris is used to fill the mine first, followed by increasingly clean
layers until the surface area, which is covered with several feet of top soil. Projects like
this are enormous undertakings and require extensive use of heavy equipment and
numerous employees. The NAML is proud to employee Navajo workers for these
projects and train them with marketable job skills, such as operating heavy machinery or
the rudiments of environmental engineering.64
The NAML also works with the funding provided by the Uranium Mill Tailings
Remedial Action Legislation (UMTRA), to reclaim uranium tailings piles. One of the
largest projects the NAML conducted involved closing many of the first uranium mines
on the reservation in Cane Valley, Arizona and moving several separate tailing piles to a
central location in a remote western region of the reservation. The project utilized the
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most sophisticated removal methods and culturally sensitive timing for conducting the
work, and even began the project with a traditional Navajo blessing ceremony. In
addition to reclaiming the lands, the project was also aimed at restoring the community.
Over the course of the work $5 million was paid in wages to local Navajos.65
The culturally sensitive and community oriented approach to reclamation has
made the NAML a world model for uranium reclamation – and they certainly have the
most uranium mine reclamation experience to date. Soon however, other nations will also
need to address their uranium mines and tailings and it may be that they look to the
NAML for the best methods to reclaim their lands.66
Currently the NAML, in cooperation with UMTRA, has been very successful at
stabilizing most of the tailings piles across the reservation. Unfortunately, their work is
ongoing. The mines that closed in 1978 left behind approximately 25 million tons of
uranium tailings, yet the increased productivity of the later mining years is estimated to
have increased the total national uranium tailings to nearly 450 million tons. 67
Even just stabilizing these piles is proving a challenge. It is not clear what
methods will actually contain the radioactivity of the piles for the hundreds if not
thousands of more years that these piles will be radiation hazards. Many “questions have
been raised about how long dirt covering the piles would last through the millennia the
tailings will be radioactive. Or if the piles can actually be covered at all. In some
instances they are a hundred feet high and more, and cover hundreds of acres of ground.
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Huge strip-mining operations would be required just to get enough soil to do the job.”68
(Please see map on the following page for the location of many reclamation sites)

Map from: presentation by Mitchell Capitan, Crownpoint, New Mexico, Larry J. King, Church Rock, New
Mexico ENDAUM Board Members September 9, 200469

Shiprock and Tuba City Tailings Projects: Groundwater treatment
Today two of the largest ongoing reclamation projects are in Shiprock, New
Mexico and Tuba City, Arizona. In both locations there were expansive tailings piles that
have been physically stabilized, but contaminants continue to leach into the ground water.
In Shiprock, the tailings piles contain 1.7 million tons of materials covering seventy-two
acres. During the rainy season the leaching process is exacerbated, and risks entering into
the nearby San Juan River. Again, as with the Rio Puerco River, the San Juan is highly
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utilized by the local population. 70 The mill that produced these tailings operated from
1954-1967 and was owned at various times by Kerr-McGee, The Vanadium Corporation
of America, and Foote Mineral Company. During its years of operation the mill produced
1.5 million tons of ore. Throughout its operation the mill site was leased from the Navajo
Nation, and in 1973 the last lease expired and the mill reverted back to the Navajo
Nation. For a short time the site was used to instruct Navajo students how to use earth
moving equipment, but soon the Navajo Nation placed a request to the USEPA for
assistance in stabilizing the tailings piles.71
Decontamination at the site began in January of 1975 and continued throughout
the mid-80’s. This clean up, however, did not authorize work to clean up contaminated
groundwater. As a result, more recent efforts have focused on decontaminating the
groundwater. The Shiprock tailings that are precariously positioned next to the San Juan
River have led to the designation of three geological areas or concern: the river
floodplain, the eastern terrace, and the western terrace. Water in the floodplain is being
cleaned through natural flushing, which is expected to flush mill-related constituent in
one hundred years. Long term monitoring will determine the actual effectiveness of the
natural flushing. To supplement the natural flushing “during the next 10 to 20 years,
active remediation will consist of pumping contaminated ground water from two
extraction wells in the most contaminated part of the floodplain aquifer next to the San
Juan River. This water and water from the terrace regions collected in French drains is
then pumped to an evaporation pond. Institutional controls are also in place to prohibit
70
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grazing and the drilling of new water wells on the floodplain or terrace regions around
the tailing piles. Most of the drainage facilities and use restrictions will need to operate
for twenty years before contamination levels are adequately reduced.72 (Please see the
map and graph on the following pages for the Shiprock site location and sample diagram
of the groundwater remediation system operating in Tuba City, Arizona.73 For the most
updated progress at mine sites, please check Energy Information Administration (EIA)
online which has more information on the status of tailings and groundwater
remediation.74)
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Although changes are underway, they may have come too late for some. Doctors
working for the Indian Health Service in the Shiprock area were already reporting
increased rates of birth defects in the 1980’s. Dr. Evelyn Odin, a pediatrician in the
Shiprock area, reported to The Albuquerque Tribune that she had recently seen an
increase in strange birth defects ranging from a baby whose trachea and esophagus were
fused together to a baby whose intestines were not contained within his body. Although
her experiences were not conclusive evidence, her reports and those of other physicians
encouraged comprehensive medical studies that found links to uranium related radiation
exposure and birth defects.

Homes Made of Tailings and threats to SMRCA funding
The impact of the uranium mining and tailings on the Navajo communities is often
unimaginable. In several communities where there were few building materials, many
miners living near tailings piles used the disregarded ore to build their hogans, traditional
Navajo homes. There are many of these homes in the Oakspring, Arizona area near the
Tutt Mines. A Ms. Begay, interviewed by The Dallas Morning News, grew up in a
Hogan built of uranium tailings by her father, who was a miner. She recalled that, “The
miners found that with a little chipping, the waste ore rocks from the mines could be
squared up for excellent building materials for walls, floors, and foundations.” Now Ms.
Begay has thyroid problems she attributes to the radiation exposure from her home while
growing up – a danger her family did not know about. She has worked to make these
homes an EPA Superfund site, but while EPA officials acknowledge the problems with
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the homes, they say “it falls short of Superfund cleanup status because of the area’s
sparse population and an incomplete knowledge of all problem locations.”75 Although
problems with structures made of tailings were known in the early 1980’s, it was not until
1994 that the USEPA formed a cooperative plan with the NNEPA to address
deconstruction of these homes.76
Most recently, the Navajo Nation is fighting to maintain their funding under the
SMCRA legislation. President Joe Shirley has been traveling to Washington D.C. and
engaging the press to persuade Congress to prevent the unused SMCRA funds from coal
mining from leaving Navajo Control. Current proposals suggest collecting all unused
money and allocating it to the states the farthest behind on their reclamation projects.
President Shirley has argued before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
that the Navajo Nation is in more need of the SMCRA funding than any state in the
nation. He said, “There is not a state in the Union that faces the vast array of
infrastructure problems confronting the Navajo people.” He cited the facts that Navajo
“unemployment hovers around 50%, 70% percent of the Navajo people lack domestic
and municipal water for everyday use, 78% of the public roads are dirt based, with little
or no gravel, 60% of the Navajo Nation lacks basic communication services, and 60% of
the Navajo Nation lacks electrical power lines.”77
Taking the message public, Shirley’s action have been closely followed by the
Navajo publication the Division of Natural Resources, “Land, Water, Power and Quality
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of Life” Newsletter. For example the headline of the October 2005 newsletter read,
“Navajo President Joe Shirley Jr. asks Senate committee to allow mining reclamation law
to treat Nation as it treats states.”78 He has also gained the attention of regional nonNavajo newspapers, including an article published in the Gallup Independent on Friday,
March 12, 2004, the day after he first testified before the Senate committee.79
Tracking the variety of reclamation projects makes it obvious that the uranium
mining companies operated with little regard to the welfare of the Navajo people or their
homelands. A passionate article in American Indian Journal expresses it best,
“The companies have the technology on how to extract uranium. So why couldn’t
they have developed the technology of taking care of people and protecting their
environment? The companies have cleared our gazing land, they have cut down our trees,
they have bulldozed over our religious sacred sites and grave sites. They have dried up
our wells”. 80

The Navajo people have finally acted against these problems and addressed them
independently, as well as with the support of the Federal government. Through this
process they have in fact demonstrated the very best elements of Navajo selfdetermination.

ENDAUM and ISL
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In addition to recent conflicts over SMCRA legislation, the Navajo people are still
currently fighting against new proposals to start uranium mining operations on the
reservation. Most of the proposals are for operations in the Church Rock and Crownpoint
areas, located at almost the very center of the Navajo Reservation. These new operations
would be neither underground nor open mines, but rather a developing method called In
Situ Leach mining or ISL.
The Navajo people first successfully organized against uranium mining in the
spring and summer of 1979. Navajo communities spread information and recruited
residents of uranium mining areas to come and protest along with 85,000 anti-nuclearists
who demonstrated in Washington D.C. on Sunday, May 6, 1979. Elsia Peshlakai, a
Navajo woman, gave a speech that afternoon and declared uranium mining the “industry
of death”.81 She reminded the crowd that “fifty-five percent of the nation’s uranium was
on Indian land, and most of it on land belonging to the Navajos.”82 Further, she said, “we
are fighting for our families, we’re fighting now in the courts of Washington - right here.
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The Navajo people in Dalton Pass and Crownpoint, New Mexico have stopped the mines
in our area - at least for the time being.”83
Peshlakai was right, and in 1994 the next and strongest group of Navajo activists
united against proposed ISL mining in their community. This group is the Eastern Navajo
Dine Against Uranium Mining (ENDAUM). Mitchell Capitan, a resident of Crownpoint,
New Mexico started ENDAUM when he heard the NRC “was proposing to issue a
license to a company called Hydro Resources Inc. or HRI.”84 Although a small
community of 4,000 people, this one grocery store stop is nonetheless the hub of the
Eastern Dine Agency and contains the Indian Health Service regional hospital. In 1994
when the news about the HRI mining proposal broke Capitan had already had experience
with ISL mining. From 1979 to 1985 Capitan was a laboratory technician a small pilotscale ISL mine located five miles west of Crownpoint. The operation was run by Mobil
Oil Corporation and was “designed to prove that uranium could be mined without
digging tunnels and shafts and sending workers into dangerous conditions underground.
From [his] experience, [he] learned that, sure enough, uranium can be recovered in this
way. But what happens underground, out of sight of human beings is troublesome….[he]
immediately told Rita [his wife and ENDAUM co-founder] that the proposed mining was
not a good idea because restoring the groundwater to its original quality after mining is
nearly impossible.”85
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The Capitan’s took their knowledge and passion for community safety to town
meetings to inform their neighbors about the coming situation. Capitan was then
employed with the Navajo Tribal Utility Authority and worked to bring the fresh
Crownpoint water to the homes of Crownpoint residents. Knowing how precious this
pure water was to the community only further spurred Capitan to action. He founded
ENDAUM and has used community awareness, media attention, government channels
and the assistance of the Southwest Research and Information Center and New Mexico
Environmental Law Center to prevent HRI from opening an ISL mine near the
Crownpoint community for the last fourteen years.
The ISL mining process can remove uranium from depth without massive ore
removal operations. Leaching production holes are drilled on seventy-five to one hundred
and fifty foot center across the ore trend. The mining corporation then pumps water with
gaseous oxygen and sodium bicarbonate into the trend to chemically free the uranium
from the rock in the presence of this solution. The uranium-laden solution is then forced
through the ore sands under great pressure and pumped back up another hole. It is
processed at the surface by extracting it from the water using a system similar to a
household water softer, but designed to deposit uranium on the collector. The water is
then reused. For this system to work, the “uranium minerals in the ore must be soluble in
water, the geological features of the ore body cannot prohibit movement of fluids within
the ore; and the porosity of the host rock [cannot] unduly restrict movement of solutions
between drill holes.”86
The ISL method is also being used to mine uranium in Australia and projects in
the U.S. are increasing. In 2003 about sixteen percent of the world’s uranium was
86

“Highlights of Discovery Document…” 4.

56

produced by ISL mining, and eighty-five percent of U.S. uranium production was ISL87.
U.S. productions generally uses alkaline solutions while Australian systems use acid
leaching.88 However, both systems average overall ore recovery around eighty percent,
and most sites are only operable for one to three years depending on how quickly flow
through the ore is decreased by the build up of clay and silt trapped in the permeable
sediments.89 (Please see diagram below)

In Situ Leach (ISL) Minning of Uranium, Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 40, June 2003. Available online:
http://www.uic.com.au/nip40.htm

87

In Situ Leach (ISL) Minning of Uranium, Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 40, June 2003. Available
online: http://www.uic.com.au/nip40.htm
88
Ibid.,3.
89
Ibid., 2.

57

After the uranium is precipitated, generally through the use of hydrogen peroxide,
the water is re-used. However, about .5% is bled off to maintain a pressure gradient in the
well field. This is treated as waste and contains dissolved materials such as radium,
arsenic and iron. It is pumped into disposal wells, in a depleted portion of the ore body.
The re-injected water is intended to maintain a flow of water from the aquifer to the well
field and maintain pressure around the site to restrict the flow of mining solutions away
from the mining area.90 Nonetheless when the operations are complete, the groundwater
must all be treated to try and restore it to the original condition before the mining. This is
typically done through evaporation ponds.91
It is this contamination of the groundwater that most concerns the Capitans and
ENDAUM. There is considerable evidence that ISL mining will contaminate the
Crownpoint groundwater and this is a risk they are just not willing to take on top of the
long legacy of human and environmental abuse because of the uranium industry.
ENDAUM’S action to prevent mining has set a precedent. This is the “first time a grassroots organization—not to mention a Native American organization, has challenged the
licensing of an in-situ leach uranium mine by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).” So far, they have been successful. Most recently ENDAUM prevented HRI from
operating because they failed to supply or arrange funding for a predetermined clean up
plan. As a result, “now every ISL mining company in the United States will have to
include cost estimates and a full plan for cleanup in their application so that it may be
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thoroughly reviewed by the public.92 This victory is just a small step in the ongoing battle
to keep ISL uranium mining out to Crownpoint— but as long as the demand for uranium
still exists companies will still persist in trying to gain access.
The struggle is made more difficult because the U.S. federal government, the New
Mexico state government, the Navajo Nation government until recently, and many of the
Navajo people who serve to profit if they sell their land to HRI, are in favor of opening
ISL mining operations. The Bush administration has called for a new investment in
nuclear power, and HRI would mine using federal subsidies.93 The Navajo Nation was
initially interested in gaining the revenue of the mining operations. Navajo individuals
who owned allotted lands were offered payments of $367,000 once the NRC grants
licenses for the operations. These people argue that in contrast to their annual yearly
income, ranging from 2,000-10,000 dollars, this is their ticket out of poverty.94 Their
willingness to take the money has divided the community and hurt their neighbors. As
Capitan’s mother said, “’The mining operation will occur on lands that surround my own.
There will be hundreds of wells and miles of pipes throughout Crownpoint if the HRI
project is approved. Would you want this to happen to your community?’”95 The Plant
would be a half-mile from churches, schools, businesses, government offices and most
residences. Ultimately, allowing ISL mining is accepting that the “the success or failure
of this in situ (ISL) leach, or solution mining, process hinges on HRI’s ability to prevent
radioactive and trace metal contaminants from escaping the mining zone and
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contaminating the regions sole aquifer” and this is a risk that most Crownpoint residents
do not want to take.96
Just last year, ENDAUM’s effort helped bring the Navajo Nation to pass the Dine
Natural Resources Protection Act. This legislation is the Navajo Nation’s long-in-coming
exercise of their sovereignty to prevent further destruction of their land and natural
resources. The Act bans conventional open pit and shaft uranium mining, places a
moratorium on uranium processing including solution or ISL mining and as a result
protects the economic value of the Navajo Nation’s water resources, which are more
valuable now than their uranium resources. This ban will protect the health, safety and
way of life of the Navajo people and impose civil penalties on anyone who violates
them.97 Further, this ban is an acknowledgement of the bans already enacted in nearly all
of the Navajo Chapters and brings a definite resolution to ENDAUMS years of
investigation and activism.
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CONCLUSION:

Author’s photo: Sunset against the Mesa, Navajo Reservation January 2006

Although, only starting to engage in the details of environmental problems on the
Navajo reservation it is still clear that these issues are not isolated from the daily lives of
the Navajo people. The Navajo people are more connected to their land than most people
living in the United States and the environmental damage that has befallen them as a
result of the uranium industry has therefore had a tremendously profound impact. To
answer the question posed at the beginning of this paper asking if it was significant that
the uranium industry problems that finally forced the Navajo Nation to exert their selfdetermination were related to environmental degradation, health and justice: the answer is
yes. Decades of poverty, political abuse and mistreatment did not shake the foundation of
Navajo society, the people and the land, in the same way the consequences of the
uranium industry did. The extensive action, concern, innovative methods, and labor
poured into addressing the remediation of Navajo lands is evidence of this.
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While there are many lesson the United States can learn from its indigenous
nations it should especially take note of the way indigenous nations care for the earth and
prioritize protecting it for the future. A plea in the American Indian Journal said,
The uranium drillers that have moved into Crownpoint have running water and
electricity in their mobile homes while my people, not even two miles away do not have
these conveniences. These people working for uranium companies have come onto our
land with no respect for our way of life. They have given liquor to the people and have
lured young girls to go with them.” “Uranium has killed and harmed our people. Why
didn’t the companies think of what is necessary for human beings to thrive in this life?
Why can’t it be done honestly, safely and with a noble purpose? Why must people waste
the resources of the earth, to use up the gas, oil and coal supplies? The sun has been here
all along.98
The United States must learn from past mistakes and from the strength of the Navajo
People and ask themselves the same question. Just like the sign that indicated congestion
on a seemingly open stretch of road the Navajo people have a different understanding of
how to treat the earth justly. Their commitment to the land has forced them to develop
into the nation they are today. This earth appreciation is relative to the history and culture
of the Navajo people, but the time has certainly come when this environmental awareness
also needs to become more relative to the way the United States addresses environmental
issues among some of its most disadvantaged citizens.
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